

CONTRIBUTION OF PSYCHIATRIC & PSYCHOLOGICAL  
STUDY TO THE I.C.D. SCREENING CENTER.

In the selection of candidates for positions of special importance, ICD Intelligence Officers have utilized the services of their Screening Center, for such cases in which they have doubts as to political reliability, mental capacity or personal fitness. At this date over fifty candidates have been processed. The functions of the psychiatric and psychologic studies, as revealed in the Screening Center, are listed below. Following each paragraph, cases exemplifying the particular function noted, are given in numbers. The numbers refer to brief abstracts of the main issue in 25 case studies.

FUNCTIONS OF PSYCHIATRIC & PSYCHOLOGIC STUDIES ARE:

1. Determination of mental status. This is generally important for the candidates we see, since there are among them people who have been in concentration camps and otherwise suffered through the long years of the Hitler regime. However competent in the past, and politically reliable, the problem of fitness at the time of screening remains. Some candidates are referred primarily for this reason. Examples: Cases # 3,9,12,14,18,22.
2. Determination of personality structure. The primary purpose of the personality studies is:
  - a) to keep out of office those characters who are authoritarian, militaristic, domineering, brutal, or intriguers, etc., who thereby perpetuate the type of psychology sympathetic to power politics and aggressive wars, and
  - b) to favour those who have broad sympathies, tolerate criticism and are generally "democratic" in the sense of respecting their fellow men. Some candidates, politically classified as "white", are referred primarily for study of personality fitness. Examples: Cases # 1,10,11,15,16,17,19,25.
3. Determination of Nazi and anti-Nazi attitudes. The attempt on the part of the candidates to simulate anti-Nazi attitudes is common. In the absence of concrete evidence, much can be learned in this regard through a study of the childhood history and the personality, and the use of special attitude tests. Such studies may decide the issue in certain cases; in others, they may aid in confirming or challenging implications made in the political analysis. Examples: All Cases.
4. Determination of special capacities and incapacities. In the case of certain candidates, special qualifications of leadership, originality, superior endowment etc., are brought to the attention of the referring agencies. Such candidates are marked as especially useful in their field. Lack of capacity on the basis of inadequate intelligence or special lack of skills are likewise determined. Examples: Cases # 2,5,8,12,14,24,25.
5. Evidence. Psychiatric studies aid in determining the reliability of statements made by candidates, the crucial issue in certain cases. For this purpose general personality trends and motivations are studied; specific tests and observations are made. Examples: Cases # 1,4,6,10,11,19,24.

ABSTRACTS OF MAIN ISSUES IN 25 CASE STUDIES.

1. Publisher. Problem: Concession to the Nazis and collaboration with them to keep his publishing house. A number of doubtful points in the political record. Because of his good nature and sympathetic manner, investigators were favourably impressed. Psychiatric study revealed a very passive individual, never able to withstand any requirement of a very despotic father. His submissive attitudes were consistent in every situation. Hence, tho inwardly antagonistic to authority, could never withstand pressure. Concessions to Party and collaboration were confirmed. Politically and personally not suitable for his license.

2. Publisher. Question of exploitation of the Jewish situation through ownership of a Jewish movie studio, in spite of an otherwise clear record. Political activity revealed that no exploitation occurred. This was confirmed in psychiatric study and was of special importance. It was found that he would make an ideal exponent of our cause. Facilitation of license to publish his newspapers and brochures was recommended.

3. Publisher. An active political anti-Nazi, member of Bavarian Volkspartei, badly beaten up by S.A. in 1933. Technical question arose as to his status as an officer in the reserve. Ascertained by political analyst that he did not belong to the category of unattached officers and hence did not come under the ICD directives. Psychiatric study revealed that he still showed symptoms resulting from the beating in 1933 - disturbances in equilibrium, also some confusion in thinking. Recommendations made as to need of special guidance in his work as publisher, because of above.

4. Publisher. Question of printing and selling propaganda books in which the responsibility for doing so was denied. Besides the specific problem involved, problem of suitability because of personality. It could be shown that, to attain his livelihood, principles were set aside, also that he was too introverted and socially withdrawn to make adjustments necessary to any cooperative enterprise. He had managed previously as a one-man organization. License not recommended.

5. Theater Director. Question concerning his directorship of theaters for DAF. Conclusion of political analyst that such direction was no better or worse than directorship of any other theater, since during the Nazi regime all of them worked under the same conditions. The question was really whether he produced propaganda plays and submitted to Party pressure. It was found that this was not the case. Political record otherwise clean and license granted. In this case psychiatric study confirmed the anti-Nazi attitudes, in fact, demonstrated that he was an active anti-Nazi and had high leadership qualities. License recommended.

6. Chief Engineer, Radio. Question of membership in the S.A. in the case of a man who played no active role in the organization, had no membership card and, in fact, received no special advantage from the Nazis. He was able to prove satisfactorily that he rendered technical help in radio to a resistance group. Psychiatric study revealed strong anxiety states, membership in the Party during a panic phase and later attempts to undo the damage. Politically black in technical sense only. License refused for position as Chief, recommended for assistant technical job only.

7. Chief Engineer, Radio. Question related to various jobs in Nazi radio outfits, one of them under SS chiefs at the BBF. It was shown by political analyst that these jobs were all purely technical and that he did not profit thru Nazi affiliation. Documentary proof of anti-Nazi attitudes, also the fact that he avoided membership in the DAF till 1941 was corroborated by background history, personality study and tests. License recommended.

8. Director of Film for Bavaria. A well-proven anti-Nazi, he was referred for a check study as to political attitudes and personality. Found to be unusually competent, with qualities of leadership. License recommended.

9. Publisher. Claimed to have organized a resistance movement in Germany, that he joined the German General Staff as interpreter with the rank of Major, and numerous stories of dangerous exploits with Nazi courts and the Gestapo. For confirmation he supplied photostats of documents. Psychiatric study revealed an abnormal, undisciplined, egocentric personality, completely unreliable. License not granted.

10. Actor and Producer. Question of his performance in propaganda plays and, as English-speaking propagandist, in radio. Tho connected with radio and an entertainer for Nazi groups, denied any propaganda activity. Psychiatric study revealed hysterical symptoms, typical child-like denials, and strong exhibitionist tendencies. Conclusion: he must have taken part in propaganda plays and radio. Later investigation confirmed his propaganda work in theater and radio. License not recommended.

11. Engineer. Problem of collaboration with Nazi officials in the case of a man who was a member of the union of German Engineers and whose firm outfitted some important Nazi ships. A number of evasions and contradictions. Psychiatric study confirmed that evasion was a typical part of his psychology, and that he had collaborated with the Nazis. License not recommended.

12. Publisher. There was no question in this case of anti-Nazi activities and attitudes, tho an accusation of plagiarism had been made. Main problem concerned his capacity for the job. History of nervous breakdowns. It was concluded that his emotional difficulties were too severe for administrative work. Special type of employment recommended.

13. Entertainer and producer. Problem of a man who, tho not a member of the Nazi party, prospered unusually well under them and was sent abroad as entertainer for propaganda value. He claimed he had always had anti-Nazi attitudes and that his service for the Party was compulsory. Tho ruled out of a license as a result of political investigation alone, psychological study and attitude tests also revealed typical Nazi attitudes.

14. Theater Director. Found to be consistently "passive anti-Nazi", a point confirmed by background study and tests. Psychiatric investigation revealed also special gifts of originality and phantasy. Stability in his work was proven, in spite of a severe gastric neurosis. License recommended.

15. Publisher. Case of a man who, tho never a member of the NSDAP, prospered under the Nazi regime and was given a special appointment by the Party. Aside from the political study, a determining factor in withholding his license was the fact that he had a rigid, authoritarian personality.

16. Film Producer. Question: "Why, after seven years' residence in France and Italy, did this man return to Germany? A question also arose as to significance of his work as film cutter for UFA after he returned to Germany. Decided by political analyst that he did not work for Nazis abroad, and as "cutter" could not influence movie production. In psychiatric exam he was found to be rather unstable, immature, and not to be trusted with a leading position. Recommended for assistant's job. (Conclusion verified by later observation).

17. Theatrical & Film Producer. Problem concerned his production of two propaganda films and marked rise of income during Nazi regime. He tried to prove that he had no responsibility in production, and that he actually sabotaged certain films. He could show evidence of previous anti-

revealed that he produced propaganda films after using various postponing-tactics, when it was question of producing or entering the Wehrmacht, and that he justified whatever he did on the basis that there was no moral law for the artist. License not recommended.

18. Producer of Radio Plays. A fighting communist anti-Nazi who was confined eight years in a concentration camp. Question concerned primarily his psychological state resulting from years of suffering and confinement. He was found to be in good mental state except for evidence of suspicious attitude. License recommended.

19. Radio Engineer. Problem of temporary membership in NSDAP while at a professional school in Prague, claimed to be obligatory for all students at that time. Psychiatric study revealed a psychopathic personality, an unscrupulous opportunist. License not recommended.

20. Publisher. Problem of publisher who, tho consistently found to be anti-Nazi, had published one book which was distributed among Nazi organizations. It was proven that the book in question when first published was not pro-Nazi, but that later editions with revisions for the purpose of propaganda had been published by a different person. Psychiatric study revealed a consistently conscientious, anti-militaristic individual, who tho rather submissive, had refused to join the Party or publish any Nazi literature. The study confirmed the findings in the political analysis. License recommended.

21. Theater Director. Question of membership in German-Spanish and German-Italian organizations and marked rise of income. Politically cleared. Psychiatric study revealed opportunism, and concessions to the Party to maintain his career, in the case of a highly ambitious individual. Directorship license not recommended. License as actor recommended.

22. Theater Director. A passive anti-Nazi, politically clear, found unsuited to any job involving any selection of personnel because of his emotional difficulties and make-up phobias: social withdrawal, marked insecurity feelings, actual distaste for the job, which had already resulted in his selection of people who would never threaten him with criticism or new ideas. Recommendation: transfer to more suitable work in his own field of scholarship.

23. Film Distributor. Problem of candidacy for membership in NSDAP (Anwaerter). Found unacceptable by Party during period of probation and rejected. No other findings in political analysis. Cleared. All tests, background-history and personality studies confirmed the conclusion that he was consistently anti-Nazi.

24. Director of a Film Corporation. Tho politically cleared, he had worked as legal expert for the Nazis and had a considerable rise of income during that period. However there was no evidence of Party membership or affiliation or Nazi activity. In interview a sly, legalistic method of evasion was revealed in a number of replies. He was unusually cautious and apprehensive. Because of suspicions about his concessions, based on the history and finding of marked anxiety, it was recommended that he be employed in a technical capacity only, until further investigation of certain specified points in his record had been made.

25. Theater, Film, Publications. An entertainer who dealt in anti-Nazi humor, in which the question of protection by important Nazi leaders arose. Cleared politically. In psychiatric study found to be an aggressive, ambitious, authoritarian character who saw an opportunity in the unsettled condition of Germany, to acquire as many licenses as he could

9 Dec 1948

# PUBLISHERS FEAR EX-NAZIS' CONTROL

## Germans Protest Against U. S. Move to Drop Licenses— Hold Trusts May Return

By EDWARD A. MORROW

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

BERLIN, Dec. 8 — The United States Military Government's decision to abandon licensing of the press has aroused widespread fear among German publishers and legislators that control of newspapers and other publications soon will return to the hands of former Nazis and lead to the revival of giant press trusts.

Events quickly proved the fears to be well founded. Denazified owners and custodians of printing plants refused to sign lease contracts with licensed publishers. As soon as the announcement was made, an official Military Government report said the "attitude displayed by these owners amounted to open sabotage."

Since the end of the war all publishers of newspapers and periodicals have been required to obtain a license from the Information Services Division before they could operate. Under the occupation stat-

ute that is expected to be announced early next year the Military Government would retain few of the controls that it currently possesses.

### Told of Plan in October

As a result German publishers and political leaders were informed in October of a plan to relinquish licensing regulations as soon as various states enacted laws that would safeguard freedom of the press.

This decision immediately was attacked by the directorate of the Bavarian Newspaper Publishers Association and the working committee of Bavarian, Wuerttemberg-Baden and Hesse organizations. Since most printing plants are owned by former Nazis and are leased to present publishers only for a five-year period, they feared that anti-democratic elements with the support of capital in former Nazi hands would re-enter the field.

Since in many cases leases expire in 1952, present publishers are unable for the most part to build new plants or obtain new equipment, and would be driven out of the field. Publisher groups have asked the Military Government for assistance in obtaining new lease contracts. Seeking further support for their program they have asked American publishers to indorse their stand.

In requesting speedy enactment of press legislation the military

government cited four principles that it wanted contained in such laws. These included prohibition of censorship or governmental control of news, protection of the press from state or special interest groups and provision for unhampered dissemination of news and publications.

Political leaders began formulating legislation that would meet the demands. The Senate of the State of Bremen has adopted the draft of a law that prohibits censorship of any publication. The draft of a Hesse law would force print shop owners to print any publication.

In Bavaria no law has yet been drafted. However, the Free Democratic party has asked for granting of newspaper licensing power to German authorities and that the Government prohibit editors and publishers with Nazi tendencies from returning to their former professions. The Socialist party is understood also to be preparing a law along these lines.

### Seek More Opportunity

Publishers not satisfied with such laws want greater opportunity to acquire the plants that they are now using or some safeguard that they will have the use of the facilities until such time as they can build their own plants. In Bavaria only four newspapers have been able to start construction on their own publishing building.

Reports that State Department officials are planning to protest the action of the Information Serv-

ice Division were dismissed by officials of this department as "uninformed criticism." These officials pointed out that the State Department has had a hand in setting a "hands off policy" that will become effective with promulgation of the occupation statute.

"Working within the framework of that policy we are trying to get some provisions which will guarantee freedom of the press," it was said. "For if the statute is announced before such legislation is passed there will be no assurances that a free press will be permitted to develop."

### Cuban Ministry Has Bomb Blast

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

HAVANA, Dec. 8—A bomb exploded at noon today in the Ministry of Labor offices, injuring three employes and causing considerable damage. The police said the explosion occurred in the men's wash room on the third floor, which was almost destroyed. Three women working in a near-by department suffered cuts and bruises from falling glass and masonry.

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REMEMBER THE NEEDIEST!

PRESENT STATUS OF I.C.D. SCREENING CENTER

Sept. 1946.

1. T/O now in existence provides for

- a. One psychiatrist
- b. One political analyst
- c. One psychologist
- d. One enlisted man (clerk)

There is no provision for an American secretary. It is possible to secure German civilian English-speaking secretaries for which T/O's must be obtained.

2. T/E providing for three jeeps and one trailer was requested August 1, 1946, through Major Peeples, ODIC, OMGUS, Berlin, and Mr. White, Liaison Officer, OMGUS (Rear) in Frankfurt.

3. Personnel of the Screening Center are included in the T/O of Intelligence Section, ODIC, OMGUS, Berlin, but come under the administration of OMGUS (Rear), since the Screening Center must be located for convenience in the American Zone of Occupation.

4. The building formerly used by the Screening Center in Bad Homburg has been relinquished. It should not be difficult to secure a new building in the same area.

5. CAF ratings of the T/O personnel have been reduced. To attract the most competent candidates, CAF rating for the psychiatrist should be 12 or 13, that of the political analyst 11 or 12, the psychologist 9, 10, or 11.

6. The demand for the services of the Screening Center is much greater now than during the past calendar year because of the marked decrease in the

number of ICD investigators and the employment of German civilians for a number of governmental services, including de-Nazification, previously performed by American personnel.

7. Expansion. The number of professional personnel has been minimal from the beginning. Expansion in a number of the functions is urged for a number of other MG uses, besides the ICD. The Office of the Political Advisor, for example, desires a screening service for all high level political appointees. It has been suggested, also, that such services be offered to the Department of Religion and Education and the Office of Economic Affairs. In the British Zone, a screening center at Bad Oeynhausen services all their MG agencies.

SUSPENSION OF ACTIVITIES OF THE ICD SCREENING CENTER

The Screening Center was forced to suspend activities for the following reasons:

1. Failure to obtain a T/O for enlisted personnel.
2. Redeployment or transfer of all enlisted personnel. The enlisted personnel were on loan to the Center on a temporary duty basis by the 2nd MG Bn.
3. Failure to obtain a T/E for vehicles. All vehicles used by the Center were called in by order of Hq USFET July 20, 1946.
4. Loss of political analyst, Mr. Ernst Rott, French citizen, because of General Clay's order that no allied nationals may be employed in an executive, supervisory capacity within the American MG after August 31, 1946. In anticipation of this event,

an American political analyst, now a professor of Politics at Princeton University, was secured. His appointment, however, was disapproved by General Clay.